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firstname.name@centralesupelec.fr
Abstract—Cloud providers have an incomplete view of their
hosted virtual infrastructures managed by a Cloud Management
System (CMS) and a Software Defined Network (SDN) controller.
For various security reasons (e.g. isolation verification, modeling
attack paths in the network), it is necessary to know which
virtual machines can interact via network protocols. This requires
building a connectivity graph between the virtual machines, that
we can extract with the knowledge of the overall topology and
the deployed network security policy. Existing methodologies for
building such models for physical networks produce incomplete
results. Moreover, they are not suitable for cloud infrastructures
due to either their intrusiveness or lack of connectivity discov-
ery. We propose a method to compute the connectivity graph,
relying on information provided by both the CMS and the SDN
controller. Connectivity can first be extracted from knowledge
databases, then dynamically updated on the occurrence of cloud-
related events. This approach shows an exact, complete and
up-to-date connectivity graphs computation on a representative
infrastructure, in reasonable time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprise networks complexity renders the knowledge of
the connectivity an essential tool to facilitate management
tasks and enhance network security. The connectivity reveals
the links and dependencies between available machines. That
interconnection knowledge can provide useful indications to
speed up the identification of points of failure in case of
network outage, and can also be used to perform proactive
impact analysis of devices or links failure on the users.
From a security standpoint, it represents one of the building
blocks for an attack graph generation, used to perform vul-
nerability chains construction based on network connectivity
and vulnerabilities pre-requisites [13], [17], [18]. In spite of
the improvement derived from exploiting them, topology and
connectivity information are rarely available as a package to
the administrators. Considering the Cloud, difficulties arise
given the infrastructure scale, and its dynamic nature. Even
if management tools allow the online collection of useful
data regarding the topology, the construction of an up-to-
date connectivity remains a challenge, especially with tools
presenting conflicting captures of the interconnection. In phys-
ical infrastructures, the acquisition of the topology has been
vastly addressed in existing works with either passive or
active discovery methods. Those methodologies present issues
such as their intrusiveness, extensive probing traffic and path
redundancy due to the repeated interrogation of the same
interfaces across several queries. With the Cloud, in which
virtualization attacks and virtual infrastructure dynamic nature
are introduced, new methods need to be developed. Indeed,
the dynamic and customizable nature of virtual machines
deployed in the Cloud, renders difficult the installation of
agents dedicated to topology retrieval. On the other hand, given
the Cloud economic model, providers benefit from optimizing
traffic consumption, since resources are charged according to
usage, hence probing traffic should be minimal. Consequently,
the intrusiveness and bandwidth consumption incurred by
existing approaches in physical networks represent a hindrance
in the Cloud. To the best of our knowledge, we present in this
paper the first method to address the retrieval of an up-to-date
topology and connectivity in cloud environments as follows:
1) We designed a module using cloud technologies to
retrieve an updated topology and connectivity, while avoiding
limitations of physical infrastructure methods.
2) In addition to a Cloud Management Software (CMS) and
to anticipate later needs for dynamic network configuration,
we consider an environment comprising an SDN (Software-
Defined Networking) controller interfaced with the CMS.
Required information for topology and connectivity being re-
trieved from these two sources, we handle occasional conflicts
in network states.
3) Our approach encompasses two steps: Firstly, when
plugged into a running cloud environment, the module re-
trieves the current topology and builds the associated connec-
tivity. This represents the static topology and connectivity
retrieval. Secondly the module listens to change events gener-
ated inside the infrastructure and within the SDN controller in
order to update the topology and connectivity previously built
during the static steps: this represents the dynamic topology
and connectivity retrieval.
4) We performed an experimental evaluation of the pre-
sented method to determine its correctness and performance
in a realistic context, considering CPU and RAM consumption,
the volume of data generated, and execution time for the
different portions of the algorithm involved.
Section II presents the state of the art relative to topol-
ogy extraction in regular infrastructures, and Section III, the
environment, its model and our solution’s implementation.
Section IV is dedicated to the evaluation and validation, and
Section V to the conclusion.
II. STATE OF THE ART ON TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY
We present the state of the art regarding topology discovery
techniques, organized into passive and active methods. The
latter approach comprises agent-based methods, with agents
installed in each device, and monitor-based methods, less
intrusive due to the use of dedicated servers. Passive and
active methodologies applicability to the Cloud is analyzed
to uncover limits and requirements for an efficient topology
and connectivity retrieval. Focus is on topology, i.e. the archi-
tecture, since limited details, if any, are given for connectivity
retrieval approaches in the studied papers, i.e the protocols and
direction of communication between machines.
A. Passive Discovery Methods
Passive methods are based on a non-intrusive observation of
the network traffic to detect devices and reconstruct equipment
topology. Passive measurements can be carried out by the
deployment of specialized hardware such as network taps [10]
at strategic locations in the network and binding them to traffic
analyzers, however with significant costs. Other methodologies
involve port mirroring, incurring an additional workload on the
switches concerned, as each packet on the monitored ports
is copied and sent to a monitoring host [19]. Flow export
protocols such as sFlow or NetFlow can also be leveraged to
reconstruct the topology. They provide access to information
pertaining to layer 2, 3 and 4 of the OSI model. Few methods
in the literature rely solely on a pure passive methodology
for topology reconstruction. However, Eriksson and al. [9]
used passive measurements to infer structural properties in the
Internet. By observing the hop-count vectors between sources
and passive monitors, they are able to cluster sources sharing
network paths, according to similarities discovered.
B. Active Discovery Methods
There are two kinds of active methods: agent- and monitor-
based approaches.
1) Agent-based Approaches: They rely on agents deployed
in each device to audit, and often use the SNMP protocol,
with SNMP agents installed in routers, switches or end-hosts.
Network management tools allow the automated discovery of
routers, subnets and layer-3 topology. Breitbart and al. [6]
propose an algorithm based on standard SNMP information
to construct layer-2 topology. They rely on local address
forwarding tables collected in the SNMP Management In-
formation Base (MIB) of the equipment. Lowerkamp and
al. [14] have extended this work by integrating incomplete
database knowledge and non-cooperative (without SNMP)
equipments such as hubs. Even when relying on standard
protocols such as SNMP, difficulties arise due to vendors
specificities. Indeed, implementation can be extended across
platforms, and inconsistencies in table indexing schemes may
occur. This leads to additional challenges when processing
data originating from multiple sources. Besides, agent-based
approaches lead to intrusiveness into infrastructure devices,
due to the need for an agent in customers’ equipment.
2) Monitor-based Approaches: Monitor-based approaches
are more flexible than the previous ones: they use a dedicated
set of probing hosts, responsible for performing topology
acquisition by leveraging protocols and applications already
available in the users’ devices (i.e. ICMP, traceroute, ping).
They do not require the use of customers’ resources, since
they are independent from their hardware. Skitter [16], tool
developed by the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
(CAIDA), and the Test Traffic Measurement (TTM) [11]
from RIPE Network Coordination Center (NCC) are extensive
tracing systems that have been used for Internet topology
discovery at the IP level. They leverage traceroute mechanisms
between 24 to 200 monitors to reconstruct the topology.
Donnet and al. [8] determined that traceroute-based tools
for discovery can be inefficient, as they have to deal with
the redundancy induced from repetitively probing the same
interfaces. Hence, to decrease probing traffic, they opted for
Doubletree [8], an algorithm allowing to reduce simultane-
ously intra- and inter- monitor duplicated data, by starting
the probing at an intermediate distance between monitor and
destination, and performing backward (destination-rooted tree)
and forward (monitor-rooted tree) probing schemes. Monitors
share paths they already probed to their destinations, to avoid
their peers to take the same ones. In [7], they introduced
the use of Bloom filters to reduce communication overhead
induced by this path sharing methodology and proposed to
limit the number of monitors to a given destination by applying
clustering.
C. Challenges Faced in the Cloud
Since monitors need to be located on the sources’ path in
passive discovery methods, this approach is hardly adaptable
to the Cloud in which communication between VMs located
on the same hypervisor occur, without reaching the physical
network, leading to a knowledge gap in the topology discovery.
On the other hand, active discovery methods tend to impose
a heavy load on the network, incurring non-billable band-
width consumption and producing traffic potentially flagged
as malicious, which brought down to the Cloud scale is not
desirable. Agent-based methods are not suitable given the need
to install an agent on each device, especially when this virtual
machine is not directly under the control of the cloud provider.
Traditional methods can only detect whether a machine is
active or not, however, in the Cloud, virtual machines can
be in several states: paused, shutdown, in migration, hence
impacting the topology representation. Additionally, with the
multi-tenant nature of the Cloud, they are not able to attribute
each machine to their owner, which is a crucial addition in a
security context. These limitations from traditional methodolo-
gies can be addressed in the Cloud by leveraging a centralized
store containing all the needed information for the topology
reconstruction. This use of a centralized store to obtain a
knowledge base in the context of cloud infrastructures has
been addressed in following related works, while not directly
used toward topology and connectivity retrieval. Indeed, Madi
and al. [15] focus on virtualized infrastructures and tackle the
verification of compliance properties such as the co-residency,
co-ownership or virtualized ports consistency. They analyze
data sources coming straigth from the virtualized environment,
compared with data from the Openstack platform and an SDN
controller to check proper instantiation. Bleikertz and al. [5]
[4] aim to validate the correctness of instances configuration
from an isolation perspective in the context of the Cloud. A
flow analysis tool based on the extraction of virtual systems’
configuration via a number of probes, and its transformation
into a graph model is introduced. Based on generic or user
trust assumptions, the model is augmented with traversal rules,
resulting in a representation allowing to identify unwanted
information flows (isolation breach), in the infrastructure. A
differential analysis is performed when a change occurs, by
comparing the newly obtained model and the policy to detect
potential failures. The goal of these works and ours differs.
While the same tools are used in our setting (i.e. Openstack
and SDN controller) and Madi and al.’s, rather than aiming to
verify configuration correctness across the diverse layers of the
Cloud and remaining at the level of the topology as is done
in this work, we plan to retrieve both the topology and the
connectivity in real time and represent them in an exploitable
format. Besides, their choice of processing the data retrieved in
batch mode distances us from the real time property we expect
from a connectivity builder. On the other hand, Bleikertz and
al. consider the information flow in the infrastructure and
address the dynamic evolution of their analysis. However the
probes introduced for data retrieval are hypervisor-specific, in
an environment without SDN controllers.
III. BUILDING THE CONNECTIVITY IN A CLOUD
ENVIRONMENT
To retrieve the infrastructure’s connectivity, we define the
context considered. We then introduce the resulting challenges
incurred, and an environment model to help the design of the
implemented algorithm.
A. Context
We consider a cloud infrastructure in which we adopt the
standpoint of the cloud provider. Networking is handled by
an SDN controller for dynamic network configuration. This
interaction is implemented via an existing application in the
SDN controller, responsible for configuring the network as
defined by the CMS. As a result, the CMS network configura-
tion view is contained in the SDN controller. While the CMS
presents management interfaces to both the cloud provider and
the tenants, the SDN controller is exclusively managed by the
cloud provider. The administration of the virtual infrastructures
is delegated to the CMS, which interacts with the SDN
controller to provision the tenants’ networks. Multi-tenancy
allows each tenant to have its own virtual infrastructure made
up of a set of VMs interconnected by virtual networks.
Beyond the scalability and volatile nature of the tenants’
infrastructure which are characteristics of the Cloud, and need
to be considered in the solution, the combination of CMS
and SDN poses an additional challenge. Indeed, SDN enables
administrators to deploy applications in the SDN controller.
Those applications can then, according to the programmed
logic, reactively modify the flow rules on virtual switches and
directly affect the topology, without providing any feedback to
the CMS. It results in inconsistent topology views between the
Cloud Management System and the SDN Controller. On one
hand, the CMS aggregates data necessary to build the topology
and connectivity, i.e. the hypervisors and their capabilities,
the virtual machines’ location (physical hosts), their owners
as well as the networks built by the tenants and the security
rules enforced. On the other hand, the SDN controller allows
to determine flow rules generated by providers’ applications
installed on top of it, and independent from the CMS config-
uration. Flow rules are equivalent to routing rules authorizing
or forbidding connections between virtual machines based on
traffic patterns and SDN application logic. From a network
connectivity standpoint, they are the concrete realization of
security policies. They are ordered according to arbitrary
priorities given by the developer of the applications running
on the SDN controller, resulting in a hierarchical ordering of
the flow rules distributed into consecutive tables installed on
the virtual switches. Starting from the first table, packets are
matched against flow rules in decreasing order of priority and
only the flow rule corresponding to the first match is enforced.
Examples of actions can be drop, forward or jump to table.
In our context, one of those applications is interfaced with
the CMS, and implements the necessary flow rules with an
arbitrarily defined priority. A similar behavior is observed for
the other applications installed on the SDN controller. Only
the flow rules installed with a higher priority than the ones
installed via the SDN application interfaced with the CMS are
unknown to the CMS and impact the resulting connectivity.
Indeed, in case of positive match with an incoming packet, the
actions requested in those rules will superseed lower priorities
ones (in particular, the ones from the CMS).
B. Overview of the Connectivity Extraction Process
To obtain a consistent view of the connectivity requires
using data from both the CMS and the SDN controller.
We rely on the CMS to obtain its vision of the topology
and the connectivity, connectivity being later modified by an
identification via the SDN controller of higher priority rules
installed. Addressing the discrepancies between the CMS and
the SDN controller requires the following steps:
1) Building the initial topology and connectivity as viewed
by the CMS, using the CMS databases;
2) In the SDN controller, leveraging the provided APIs to
identify the applications interfaced with the CMS and register
the priorities of the flow rules they provision;
3) Via the SDN controller, listing the flow rules installed,
and retaining only the flow rules with higher priorities than
the ones identified in Step 2. Let FR be this collection of flow
rules;
4) Processing each flow rule in FR, and based on the
combination of layer 3 and 4 protocols data, querying the
connectivity graph to obtain the endpoints and links to modify.
This results in a coherent static connectivity graph, reconciling
the CMS and SDN controller views. For this view to be main-
tained considering flow rules changes in the SDN controller, a
monitoring application reacts to every rule update, addition or
removal, determining whether the flow rule should belong to
FR. When it does, Step 4 is repeated for the concerned flow
rule.
C. Cloud Environment Model
From any Cloud Management System used in virtual in-
frastructures, the same building blocks can be extracted to
set up topology: Hypervisor, Virtual Machine, Security Rule,
Security Group, Tenant, Virtual Port, Virtual Router, Subnet
and Network. Networks and subnets refer to the virtualized
context, while routers interconnect VMs belonging to distinct
subnets. Security groups represent a collection of security rules
that are applicable to virtual machines. They contain the IP
range, port range, protocol (TCP, UDP or ICMP) and direction
of the traffic authorized on the virtual machines. An additional
option indicating traffic allowed considering the originating
security group can also be provided. Let H, VM, SR, SG, T,
VP, VR, S and N be the sets representing the collection of
hypervisors (physical nodes), virtual machines, security rules,
security groups, tenants, virtual ports, virtual routers, subnets
and networks respectively. We define predicates classified in
two categories: topology-related and connectivity-related. In
their expression, h ∈ H, {vm,x,y} ∈ VM, t ∈ T, secr ∈ SR,
secg ∈ SG, vp ∈ VP, vr ∈ VR, s ∈ S, n ∈ N. The topology-
related predicates are the following:
• instantiate(h,vm): means that the hypervisor h is the host
of the virtual machine vm,
• own(t,X) where X ∈ VM or X ∈ S or X ∈ SG: means that
the tenant t is the owner of the element X,
• isAttachedTo(vp,X) where X ∈ VR or X ∈ VM: means that
the element X is attached to the virtual port vp,
• isLinkedTo(s,n): means that the network n is linked to the
subnet s,
• belongTo(s,vp): means that the virtual port vp belongs to
the subnet s.
The connectivity-related predicates are the following:
• contains(secg,secr): means that the security group secg
contains the security rule secr,
• isEnforcedOn(secg, vm): means that the security group
secg is enforced on the virtual machine vm,
• areConnected(x,y): means that the communication is pos-
sible between x and y for at least one combination of
protocol, addresses and ports.
areConnected is a predicate partly deduced from the others.
Two virtual machines areConnected if they are either on the
same subnet or on subnets linked by routers, and their security
rules allow communication for at least one combination of
addresses, ports and protocol. Subnet information is provided
by belongTo and isLinkedTo, while reasoning on security rule
applicability is permitted by the predicates isEnforcedOn and
contains. The content of the rules themselves is then inter-
preted in order to derive connectivity among virtual machines.
In the rest of this paper, we model the network topology as
a graph, which can be directly derived by assimilating the
building blocks to typed nodes and the predicates to typed
relationships. Figure 1 shows the graph model obtained. In
the next section, we present environment dynamics and their
modifications on a topology and connectivity graph based on
this graph model.
Tenant Virtual
Machine
Port Router Subnet Hypervisor
Security
Group
Security
Rule Network
owns
owns
owns
instanciates
contains
isEnforcedOn
belongsTo
isLinkedTo
isAttachedToisAttachedTo
Fig. 1. Graph Model
D. Topology and connectivity graph construction
In this section, we provide more details on the topology and
connectivity graph construction algorithm. Figure 2 illustrates
our architecture: a cloud infrastructure administrated by a
CMS and an SDN controller whose data are processed by
the topology and connectivity builder. The SDN controller
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App
Admin
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Fig. 2. Architecture
comprises an SDN monitoring application, listening to
flow rule events generated by other applications. Rule
characteristics are then stored in the SDN rule database.
In parallel, the topology and connectivity builder runs in
a dedicated server. It first creates a static topology and
connectivity by processing the CMS database and stores
the obtained representation into its own graph database.
Secondly, it listens to CMS-generated events to update its
view. The events tracked are the creation, deletion, update
and status change of virtual elements. Their impact on the
topology and connectivity, considering changes occurring on
virtual machines are presented in Table I. In this table, arrows
represent the creation of an edge (predicate) whose type is
given by the label written above. A crossed arrow represents
the deletion of the predicate.
1) Static Phase: During the static phase, the aim is to es-
tablish a baseline topology and connectivity. We begin with the
static topology, built with data from the Cloud Management
Database. The network topology is built first, it is comprised
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF ELEMENTARY ACTIONS PERFORMED ON VIRTUAL MACHINES
IN CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE TOPOLOGY
Common actions Effects
Create Node creation: vm
Node attribute modification: vm.state=active
vm owns←−−−− tenant
vm
isEnforcedOn←−−−−−−−−−− secgroup
vm instantiate←−−−−−−−− hypervisor
Generation of a port create event
Node creation: port
subnet
belongsTo←−−−−−−− port
port isAttachedTo←−−−−−−−−−− vm
vm areConnected←−−−−−−−−−− vmx, where vmx is an existing
machine able to communicate with vm
Delete vm 6 owns←−−−− tenant
vm 6 isEnforcedOn←−−−−−−−−−− secgroup
vm 6 instantiates←−−−−−−−−− hypervisor
Generation of a port delete event
subnet 6 belongsTo←−−−−−−− port
port 6 isAttachedTo←−−−−−−−−−− vm
Node deletion: port
Node deletion: vm
Deactivate:
Pause, Shutdown,
Shelve, etc.
Node attribute modification: vm.state=inactive
Activate:
Unpause, Start,
Unshelve, etc.
Node attribute modification: vm.state=active
Update(params) vm.params=params
of the interactions between virtual machines, virtual ports, sub-
nets, networks, virtual routers, security groups, security rules
and tenants. In order to optimize its generation, we leverage the
multi-tenant nature of the Cloud: the network topology of each
tenant is independently built by concurrent threads, allowing
to parallelize the task. This method allows to speed up the
construction, especially when a lot of tenants are considered.
Once the network topology of each tenant is obtained, the
relationship is established with the cloud provider’s physical
infrastructure by creating an instantiates predicate between the
tenants’ virtual machines and their corresponding hypervisors.
After generating the static topology (global topology), static
connectivity is obtained according to Algorithm 1. It is built by
identifying groups of machines able to communicate, due to
Algorithm 1: Building static connectivity using the CMS
Data: tenants list, global topology
Result: CMS Connectivity in virtual infrastructure
1 foreach tenant in tenants list do
2 routers list = getRoutersList(tenant);
3 standaloneSubnets list =
getSubnetsWithNoRouter(routers list) ;
4 foreach router in router list do
5 virtualMachines list =
getVmsConnectedViaRouter(router);
6 foreach machine in virtualMachines list do
7 securityRules list = getSecurityRules(vm);
8 foreach sr in securityRules list do
9 relatedVms list =
identifyRelatedVms(virtualMachines list,
sr.protocol, sr.ip dst, sr.ip src, sr.ip prefix,
sr.sec group id, sr.direction);
10 createAreConnected(vm, relatedVms,
global topology);
11 foreach subnet in standaloneSubnets list do
12 virtualMachines list = getVmsSubnet(subnet)
/* repeat line 6 to 10 */
their interconnection with routers or their belonging to a same
subnet (lines 2-3). Each machine cluster is then processed to
determine the effective possible communication as stated by
security rules contained in the security groups they depend
on (lines 8-10). This phase generates areConnected links as
viewed by the CMS (line 10). Additionally, since flow rules
provisioned by SDN applications are hierarchical, we identify
the ones with a higher priority than the rules provisioned by the
CMS application in the SDN controller, by querying the Flow
Rules registry in the SDN controller, as shown on lines 1-4 in
Algorithm 2. Indeed, these are the rules yielding discrepancies
between the views from the CMS and the SDN controller.
We develop a Monitoring Application installed on the SDN
controller, responsible for identifying and registering these
rules in a separate SDN rule database. Parameters contained
in each rule allow to match the related CMS areConnected
links and modify them according to the SDN view of the
connectivity as shown on lines 6-8 in Algorithm 2.
2) Dynamic phase: During the dynamic phase, an event
listener intercepts topology-related notifications generated by
the Cloud Management System to store them in a queue.
Events are then processed by queue consumers to update the
topology and connectivity graph with the changes induced
by those notifications as defined in Table I. The events are
processed to modify the topology, as well as the connectivity
reported in the graph. The SDN applications are also
continuously monitored, in order to register any impactful
modification caused by a rule creation, update or removal.
The information gathered by this monitoring application
allows to update an SDN rules database (see Figure 2) and
modify the areConnected links accordingly.
Algorithm 2: Updating the static connectivity using the
SDN Controller
Data: CMSAppsIds list, virtualSwitches list,
connectivityGraphDB
Result: Merged Connectivity using CMS and SDN controller
1 CMSFlowrulePriorities set =
getFlowrulePrioritiesByAppsIds(CMSAppsIds list);
2 foreach switch in virtualSwitches list do
3 installedRules list = getSwitchFlowrules(switch);
4 superseedingRules list =
getSuperseedingRules(installedRules list,
CMSAppsIds list, CMSFlowrulePriorities set);
5 foreach rule in superseedingRules list do
6 ruleCharacteristics = getRulesCharacteristics(rule);
7 connectivityLinks =
findMatchingPatterns(connectivityGraphDB,
ruleCharacteristics);
8 updateConnectivityGraphDB(connectivityGraphDB,
connectivityLinks, getRuleAction(rule));
E. Implementation
We describe in this section the technologies leveraged in
our solution.
1) Cloud Management System: We based our solution on
Openstack as our CMS, an open source software for building
cloud platforms and controlling pools of compute, storage and
networking resources. Information regarding the state of the
platform are stored in databases by Openstack. We collect data
from Keystone, Nova and Neutron databases, respectively the
identity, compute and network services of the management
system (Openstack). In Keystone database, we retrieve the
tenants and their associated projects, a project being the canvas
in which users define their virtual environments (networks,
virtual machines, security groups, etc.) The information on
the hypervisors and the virtual machines they host is obtained
by interrogating the Nova database. The networks, subnets,
routers, security groups and security rules are extracted from
Neutron database.
2) SDN Controller: Given the scale of the Cloud and
requirements for availability and performance, we opted for
the use of ONOS (Open Network Operating System) [2],
an SDN controller oriented towards service providers. It is
designed to scale with the size of the network with the
ability to get a cluster of controllers, hence it represents a
good fit for service providers. Besides, its integration with the
Openstack platform and its rich API, easing new applications
development, are additional reasons motivating our choice. We
leveraged its FlowRuleService to get information on flow rule
events in virtual switches, namely updated, created or deleted
flow rules. Flow rules unique identifiers allow to track their
life-cycle. In flow rules, we first extract information on priority
and matching patterns targeted (protocol, transport layer port,
ip address, virtual switch port number, virtual switch port mac
addresses, etc.). Next, we associate it to the corresponding
virtual machine in Openstack. Then, we identify the treatment
applied to the selected traffic (drop, allow) for that virtual
machine. Both pieces of information are stored in the SDN
rule database. When an event notification is made, the rule ID
is used to modify, create or delete the corresponding entry.
3) Connectivity Database : Following on our graph rep-
resentation of the environment, we found a suitable and
flexible storage solution in graph databases. Indeed, such
solutions represent a natural fit for scenarios such as network
topology retrieval, as they natively store data as graphs,
with edges representing relationships between typed vertices.
Pattern matching and graph traversal operations allows a fast
query processing. We opted for the use of Neo4j [1], an
open-source graph database implemented in Java that shows
interesting performance as illustrated in [12]. The use of Neo4J
as database allows to build labeled vertices and edges as
defined by the environment graph model (Figure 1). Further-
more, they can be augmented with additional properties. For
instance, by adding a tenant id property to each concerned
node, we avoid cluttering the graph with multiple ownership
relationships while maintaining an efficient traversal.
IV. EVALUATION
The experiments performed aim to evaluate our approach for
topology and connectivity construction considering the four
phases involved in the algorithm, i.e. static topology and con-
nectivity construction, and dynamic topology and connectivity
updates. Dimensions measured are the execution time, the
CPU and RAM consumptions and volume of data generated
by the algorithm, in order to determine the efficiency of the
approach in a realistic setting. They are exclusively relative to
our algorithm behavior. We identified virtual machines, routers
and security rules as being the most significant parameters
of the algorithm. We performed the evaluation by modifying
those parameters and considering the dynamic events effect
according to their types, i.e. creation or deletion. Experi-
ments presented are implemented using the Grid’5000 testbed
(https://www.grid5000.fr). 49 physical servers are used, on
which Openstack Newton (CMS) is installed with 1 Controller
server, 1 Network server and 45 Compute servers. A server is
dedicated to ONOS, the chosen SDN controller. Another one
is used for the topology and connectivity builder. Each server
has 1 Intel Xeon X3440 CPU, 4 cores per CPU and 16GB of
RAM.
1) Tenant’s Infrastructure: To better understand the param-
eters’ impact, we consider a cloud infrastructure containing a
single tenant, with a generic 3-tier application consisting of
3 components: web, app and DB, as illustrated in Figure 3.
In this tenant’s architecture, the number of web servers and
application servers are considered dynamic. This experiment
Internet
Web App DB
Internal
2 VMs
2 VMs50 … 500 VMs50 … 500 VMs
Fig. 3. Tenant’s Virtual Infrastructure
is designed to assess the impact of the number of virtual
machines on the dimensions introduced. We also consider the
processing time to take into account the effects incurred by
the deletion or creation of security rules and routers in the
infrastructure. We vary the number of VMs between 100 and
1000, splitted equally among web and app servers. It accounts
for a representative range, justified by the RightScale 2017
report [3] in which, a survey is made on the VM loads ran by
Openstack users. As a result, the largest fraction (16%) have
between 1 and 50 VMs, while only 4% have over 1000 VMs.
2) Algorithm Correctness: The verification aims to validate
the correctness of the algorithm in the generation of the static
connectivity, then, its ability to interpret correctly dynamic
events triggered and update adequately the connectivity graph.
Besides, we also verify that actions enforced by SDN flow
rules are correctly translated into connectivity graph updates,
hence allowing to mitigate discrepancies between CMS and
SDN controller. To that end, we generate a smaller tenant
infrastructure (30 VMs), on which we manually establish the
connectivity. We then run the algorithm on the designed ar-
chitecture and compare its output to the connectivity obtained
manually. Virtual machine, router and security rule creation
and deletion events are then generated. Connectivity links
generated by those events via the algorithm are compared to
their manually obtained counterparts. Evaluating the algorithm
ability to address CMS and SDN controller is done by devel-
oping on the SDN controller an application pushing flow rules
superseeding Openstack’s ones and verifying the proper update
of the concerned connectivity links. All these steps allow to
confirm the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
3) CPU Consumption and Volume of Data Generated:
Figure 4 represents the CPU consumption for the duration
of experiments made to compute the connectivity, with 100
VMs and 1000 VMs. The same representation strategy is
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Fig. 4. Cpu Consumption for 100 and 1000 VMs infrastructures
adopted for the volume of data generated by the topology
and connectivity builder in Figure 5. Given space constraints,
only the downloaded data is represented, the uploaded data
having a similar shape. The CPU consumption pattern is the
following: first an interval, then a series of discontinuous CPU
consumptions. The intervals at the beginning are an illustration
of the static topology and connectivity construction of the
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Fig. 5. Bandwidth consumption - Download link for 100 and 1000 VMs
infrastructures
algorithm, while the intermittent usage illustrate the reception
and treatment of an event by the algorithm, with CPU load
varying according to the type of events treated. To process
1000 VMs, only 40% of CPU is requested (with some fringe
values to 80%), leading us to conclude that our algorithm is
efficient regarding that parameter. In Figure 5, the peak at
the beginning are the requests from the builder to the CMS
and SDN controller to obtain the initial data requested to build
the static topology and connectivity. The smaller peaks are the
queries performed on the reception of an event. Given the data
volume requested (400kB max.), the impact of our approach
on the CMS and the SDN controller is considered negligible.
4) Memory Consumption: For a high number of VMs, we
might observe the two phases of the algorithm as illustrated
in Figure 6: a peak of consumption in the beginning for the
static phase, then a decrease during the dynamic phase to
reach a more or less constant value. After an high memory
consumption (14GB) at the beginning for the static phase,
values tend to stabilize to reach 8GB for 1000 VMs. A Similar
pattern is shown for 800 VMs. These values are explained
by the creation and processing of a wide array of object in
memory, in order to obtain the topology and connectivity of
the tenant. Interestingly, for 900 VMs, the curve is similar to
lower VMs amount, with a progressive RAM increase until
reaching constant, and no peak at the beginning. Our server
with 16 GB in total could be overloaded when considering
over a thousand VMs. Hence the necessity as future work to
design an algorithm that could scale out according to the load,
in order to address the number of VMs.
5) Time Performance : We gain at least a factor 10 on [6]
for the topology construction, with 3s against 32s. The static
connectivity curve in Figure 7 shows a quadratic trend in the
number of VMs, which represents an acceptable complexity
for this section of our algorithm. However, the event-based
processing approach we adopted frees us from successively
repeating the time overhead incurred by the static phase.
Indeed, the topology and connectivity is not rebuilt from
scratch at each event received, but merely updated with the
delta incurred. It allows to save resources but also increases
execution time. Indeed, as shown in Figures 8, 9 and 10, event
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time processing ranges between 80ms and 12s to have an
updated view of the connectivity, according to the type of event
received: VM deletion is faster with roughly 100ms, while VM
creation takes up to 12s for 1000 VMs. We manage to process
router disconnection under 3.5s, since upon creation of the
connectivity link, it is tagged with the reason for its existence,
meaning router id and security rule id responsible for the
connection, allowing a fast lookup of the related connected
links. In the worst case, this allows to process roughly 5 events
per minute for 1000 VMs.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified the topology and connec-
tivity extraction as a building block for risk management solu-
tions in Cloud environments. By modeling the virtual environ-
ment and leveraging technologies available such as the CMS
and the SDN controller, we designed a non-intrusive approach
allowing to obtain an up-to-date view of tenants’ architectures.
This approach also addresses potential discrepancies between
the states of the Cloud controller and the SDN controller,
thus leading to an accurate representation of the connectivity.
The experiments carried out illustrate the approach efficiency
considering the virtual infrastructure scale. Indeed, starting
from scratch, approximately 18mins is required to build the
topology and connectivity for over 1000 virtual machines,
without generating an excessive bandwidth for the concurrent
services, or a CPU overload on the dedicated server. Modifying
the graph connectivity according to change events can be done
in between 100ms and 12s, according to the type of event
considered, exempting us from repeating costly initializations,
and allowing to process 5 modifications per minute in the
worst case. On the other hand, the connectivity built using data
extracted from the CMS and the SDN controller has an optimal
exhaustiveness in our context. Indeed, our approach being
oblivious to potential software firewalls configured by tenants
in their virtual machines, it results in an over-approximation
of the tenants’ virtual machines connectivity. We may report
configured (via CMS or SDN), but non-effective connections
between VMs due to a lack of visibility into tenants’ virtual
machines. However this is an acceptable approximation in a
risk management context, as no potential connection link is left
out of the representation. For future work, the most expensive
operations lying in the establishment of the static connectivity,
we aim to parallelize its construction to reduce building time,
as we only did it for the static topology. Additionally, improve-
ments could be made in the dynamic topology phase by using
several consumers to process the events in the CMS queue.
Due to memory consumption, a modification of the algorithm
could be performed to enable scaling and load distribution
to other servers. Besides, we identify interesting potential in
replicating this event-based approach for maintaining attack
graphs in cloud infrastructures, hence expressing the exposure
needed for risk management solutions in Cloud environment.
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